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Casi todo en la vida tiene un lado brillante y un lado
oscuro. El decomiso de las ganancias, efectos e
instrumentos del delito no es una excepción…
Les propongo que dirijan su mirada hacia el lado oscuro
en lo tocante a los derechos humanos a través de un caso
CASE OF PAULET v. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
(Application no. 6219/08) 
STRASBOURG 13 MAY 2014
Recurso de apelación: resulta opresivo y por lo tanto constituye un abuso
de proceso (o desviación de poder) por parte de la UK imponer una
orden de decomiso de la totalidad de los ahorros del reo conseguidos
trabajando durante casi cuatro años.
Argumento: el Parlamento aprobó la Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 con la
intención de que su aplicación se realizase de un modo que resultase
compatible on los requisitos de la CEDH. Por lo tanto, a la luz del artículo
1 del Protocolo nº 1, para que la orden de decomiso fuese proporcionada
debía estar conectada racionalmente a los objetivos de interés público
perseguidos y no ir más allá de lo necesario para lograrlos.
Rechazada el 28 de julio de 2009
“His earnings, of course, reflected the fact that he had done the necessary
work, as we shall assume, to the satisfaction of his various employers. But
the opportunity for him to do so, that is the pecuniary advantage, was
unlawfully obtained. If the employee worked to his employer’s satisfaction,
and he paid his tax and National Insurance contributions on his earnings, and
his deception either lacked any significant wider public interest, or, perhaps
because of the passage of time, but for whatever reason, had ceased to have
any meaningful effect on his employers’ decision to continue his employment,
the resolution of the issue might well be different. As it is there was here a
wider public interest. The appellant was deliberately circumventing the
prohibition against him seeking remunerative employment in this country
in any capacity. No basis for interfering with the order made in the Crown
Court has been shown. In our judgment the appropriate link between the
appellant’s earnings and his criminal offences, in the context of the wider
public interest, was plainly established. “
RECURSO ANTE TEDH
La orden de decomiso constituyó una injerencia desproporcionada en su
derecho al pacífico disfrute de sus bienes en el sentido del art. 1 del
Protocolo nº 1 CEDH:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the
public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by
the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right
of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of
property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
El TEDH concluyó:
in assessing whether or not the confiscation order in the present case was
“oppressive” and thus an “abuse of process”, the Court of Appeal did ask
whether or not the order was in the public interest. However, having
decided that it was, they did not go further by exercising their power of
review so as to determine “whether the requisite balance was maintained
in a manner consonant with the applicant’s right to ‘the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions’, within the meaning of the first sentence of
Article 1”
The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude
that in the circumstances of the applicant’s case there has been a violation
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
The Court recalls that the violation found in the present case was procedural in
character, based as it was upon the lack of a review of the confiscation order
capable of satisfying the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention. It cannot be excluded that, had a sufficiently wide review been
conducted by the domestic courts, this Court would have found an outcome
involving confiscation of the applicant’s remaining assets, as occurred in the
present case, to be consistent with the Convention. The sum claimed by the
applicant in respect of pecuniary damage as just satisfaction under Article 41 is in
the region of the amount of the confiscation order made against him ((…). However,
in the absence of a proximate causal link between the procedural violation found and
financial loss sustained by the applicant by reason of the confiscation order, the
Court cannot make an award to the applicant under this head. Nevertheless, the
Court recognises that the applicant must have suffered some anguish and frustration
as a result of the failure of the domestic courts to conduct a Convention-compliant
review of the confiscation order. It would therefore award him EUR 2,000 in respect
of such non-pecuniary prejudice.
TheECHR
Held, by six votes to one, that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 to the Convention;
Held, by five votes to two,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the
date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into pounds sterling at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect
of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the
applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the
marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus
three percentage points;
Dismissesd unanimously, the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE KALAYDJIEVA JOINED BY JUDGE BIANKU AS 
REGARDS ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION 
Unlike in Phillips, however, it has not been submitted that such employment
constituted itself a crime on the part of the applicant, or that the regulation of
the domestic labour market went so far as to make any irregularly obtained
employment criminal or punishable in any manner. Likewise, it has not been
contended that the applicant’s work caused any public or private harm rather
than contributing to the public welfare. Notwithstanding this situation, the
applicant’s genuinely earned savings were defined and confiscated as the
“proceeds of the crime” of using a false passport – an act for which the
applicant was punished in separate proceedings. The difference between the
reasonable assumption as to the criminal origin of the confiscated property in
the case of Phillips and the remote or indeed non-existent link between the use
of a false passport and the genuine earning of the confiscated amounts in the
present case appears quite obvious.
(…)Limiting the scope of the present case to only some of its “procedural
aspects”, the majority failed to express any views on whether the applicable
legislation was sufficiently precise as to the conditions for forfeiture,
whether the domestic courts were required to analyse the link between the
assets proposed for forfeiture and the specific crime, and whether they did
so in the present case.
(…) For these reasons I also disagree with the majority’s view as to the
“absence of a proximate causal link between the procedural violation found
and financial loss sustained by the applicant by reason of the confiscation
order” (see paragraph 73). In the absence of any subsequent examination of
this causal link and/or the proportionality of the uncontested interference,
the applicant should have been awarded compensation in pecuniary
damage, and not merely for moral damage.
ALGUNAS REFLEXIONES
-¿Qué es la relación de causalidad para el TEDH?
-¿No hay relación de causalidad entre la falta de ponderación del tribunal británico y 
el perjuicio económico irrogado por el decomiso del dinero  y sí la hay en cambio 
entre la utilización del pasaporte falso y la obtención de ese dinero trabajando???
-¿Por qué se admiten como  pago de tributos por rentas del trabajo el dinero 
”procedente del delito “ ? ¿Blanqueo de capitales  “lícito”  para la Hacienda Publica? 
-Efecto perverso: si no se realiza la ponderación, el decomiso es desproporcionado 
sólo en el plano procesal, no material, y no se devuelve lo decomisado.  
Contraste con GYRLYAN v. RUSSIA (9-10-218); ISMAYILOV v. RUSSIA (6-11-2008):
-Violación material del art. 1 del protocolo nº 1. desproporcionado 
decomiso acumulado a pena de prisión suspendida. Decomiso es también 
sanción.  
-TEDH entra a valorar críticamente , sin que ello sea necesario, el delito 
tipificado en el ordenamiento ruso del que el dinero decomisado es objeto 
material. 
- Dinero decomisado debe ser “devuelto” al reo.
-La falta de racionalidad  y el carácter coyuntural de las decisiones del TEDH 
redunda en detrimento de su propia misión y “auctoritas”
